Specific policies/processes for improving workers' protection
The article 13 of the 2014 Constitution states that: “The State shall protect workers' rights and strive to build balanced work relationships between both parties to the production process. It shall ensure means for collective negotiations, protect workers against work risks, guarantee the fulfillment of the requirements of security, safety and occupational health, and prohibit unfair dismissal, all as regulated by Law”.[1]
To ensure this commitment is translated into action, the state has committed to allocating a percentage of government expenditure of no less than 3 % of GDP [2] to health, almost double its current allocation. The percentage is expected to increase gradually to reach global rates with improvements in the economy and better targeting of subsidies to the poor. 

Available data on companies (public and private)
Figures from the Ministry of Insurance in 2003 estimated that 30% [3] of private companies did not pay contributions for their employees (either all or some of them only). Due to the low enforcement of labor laws, companies are free to reduce their employees’ protection. In other words, the system is faced with a significant social evasion phenomenon and provides very few incentives for poor households to participate in social protection, which in turn severely hampers its assigned poverty alleviation function. By failing to reach the poor and the most vulnerable workers, while mainly reaching groups that already enjoy relative privileges on the labor market (formal workers, in the public or private sector), social insurance can actually contribute to increase existing inequalities, hence compromising its primary mission. 

Available data on workers
The country labor force was 27.9 million in 2014. 29% work in agriculture, 24% in industry and 47% in services. The unemployment rate was 13% in 2014 [4].

Available data on workers covered with occupational safety and health insurance
The coverage is low.  One of the reasons why coverage is low and social insurance is not as efficient as it was planned to be is that it has various inherent flaws that create negative incentives for workers and employers to participate.
As has often been highlighted in the literature, the high social insurance contribution rates requested from both the employers and employees, combined with weak enforcement of law, encourages employers and employees either not to participate in the social insurance system or to contribute with amounts that are lower than their actual wage. Many employees cannot afford to contribute if they want to survive on a daily basis, because of poverty. Poor households cannot afford to save future consumption when their daily earnings hardly cover their immediate consumption needs. 


[1] Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt - 2014 http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf
[2] http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Feature%20Story/mena/Egypt/Egypt-Doc/egy-roadmap- sj-health.pdf
[3] International Labor Organization, Egypt 
[4]  CIA World Factbook